As Shia Muslims prepare for 9th and 10th Muharram – the commemoration of the death of Imam Hussein – a litany of attacks has begun.

Baghdad:

Two worshippers were killed and eight others wounded when a bomb struck a procession in the eastern neighbourhood of Baghdad Jadida (New Baghdad) in the afternoon, a police officer said, speaking on condition of anonymity.

In a separate attack in the east Baghdad neighbourhood of Fedhailia, three people were killed and five wounded by a bomb, according to an interior ministry official who did not want to be named.

Also on Saturday army Lieutenant Colonel Ibrahim Khalil was shot dead by unidentified gunmen along a main road in east Baghdad, the official added.

And in the predominantly Sunni town of Abu Ghraib, just west of the capital, tribal leader Mahmoud Jassim al-Obeidi was killed by a bomb exploded outside his home early Saturday, a local official said.

- AFP

Karachi:

A roadside bomb injured 19 people in Karachi as a procession made its way in the Paposh Nagar area in Karachi. The attack comes a day before the country also marks the second death anniversary of the former Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto, who was assassinated in Rawalpindi after a rally.

Beirut:

A bomb exploded in a car in the southern suburbs of Beirut on Saturday, security sources told Reuters.

A man holds a box of Pakistan-made "Super Osama Bin Laden, Kulfa Balls" milk and coconut flavour hard candies bought at a bazaar in Kandahar city (REUTERS/Jorge Silva)

In the days following 9/11, there was barely a minute where one didn’t hear the name Osama Bin Laden uttered. Fast forward eight years, and one barely heard of him, unless it was a brief mention in a journal piece. There was a brief flurry of excitement in September when a new recording surfaced but that was it.

Until a few weeks ago, when a plethora of statements about OBL emerged. Where is he? Where was he? Is he dead? Is he alive? Pakistan really should have captured him by now, don’t you think?

I spent a few months reading several books about Pakistan and the war on terror, the narratives were so similar that at some point I felt I could rattle off OBL’s entire history. But there were still nuggets of information that have popped up this year:

From Vanity Fair, an excerpt of son Omar bin Laden’s book (Angry Arab on the book here):

Many people found my father to be a genius, particularly when it came to mathematical skills. It was said that his own father was a numerical genius who could add up large columns of numbers in his head.

My father was so well known for the skill that there were times that men would come to our home and ask him to match his wits against a calculator. Sometimes he would agree, and other times not. When he would good-naturedly accept the challenge, I would grow so nervous that I would forget to breathe.

And then there’s the report that has been doing the rounds this month of OBL’s escape from Tora Bora:

Most of the Tora Bora complex was abandoned and many of the caves and tunnels were buried in debris. Only about 20 stragglers were taken prisoner. The consensus was that al Qaeda fighters who had survived the fierce bombing had escaped into Pakistan or melted into the local population. Bin Laden was nowhere to be found. Two days later, Fury and his Delta Force colleagues left Tora Bora, hoping that someone would eventually find bin Laden buried in one of the caves.

There was no body because bin Laden did not die at Tora Bora. Later U.S. intelligence reports and accounts by journalists and others said that he and a contingent of bodyguards departed Tora Bora on Dec. 16. With help from Afghans and Pakistanis who had been paid in advance, the group made its way on foot and horseback across the mountain passes and into Pakistan without encountering any resistance.

I actually didn’t find anything shocking about it altogether – the ‘missed chances’ described in books on Al Qaeda and OBL are numerous – and telling of how the world’s most wanted man has become a sidebar of sorts in this epic AfPak saga.  There seems to be – at least on the record – no credible intelligence of where OBL has been recently, though this report of OBL having been in Afghanistan this year was interesting.

That said..

Al Jazeera’s Imran Khan blogged about why finding OBL is key:

If Osama is captured or killed, the Taliban will still be a force to be reckoned with. Neither Pakistan nor Afghanistan will become secure. But if you are the US government right now and you need something to that suggests your new AfPak strategy is working, then Bin Laden’s head on a platter is looking like a good idea right about now.

Sadly, say many in Pakistan, Bin Laden’s head will not make a difference for long term peace in the region.

And on another tangent: Iran seems to be holding OBL’s relatives in custody.

Everyone wants a piece of OBL in this part of the world!

On a side note: For anyone interested in Jordanian politics, this post up at The Black Iris – and the comments – should be your read of the week.

Those of you who are purveyors of arguing either side of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will know what i mean when I say that it’s a frustrating and cyclical thing to get worked up in a lather over. From my perspective, I feel so many people on ‘the other side’ wheel out the same tried and tested arguments, many of which seem hopelessly inane.

One of the arguments that has always carried relatively more weight with me is the whole: “Arafat blew it in 2000 when Barak offered him a state and Abbas blew it when Olmert offered him a state, what can the Palestinians expect if their leaders are always walking away when a state is actually on the table, ready to be signed?”

A salient point. But before we judge Arafat and Abbas, we need to look at the conflict, or more specifically, the ‘peace process’ and the negotiating positions of the two parties. Are we treating them as equals? And if so, should we be? I contend that we should but clearly are not doing so.

Let’s look at it like this. From the position of a negotiating party, the Israeli Prime Minister, whoever he may be, is the elected leader of a sovereign state with clearly delineated borders, a considerable standing army with impressive military capabilities including nuclear arms, recognised by most of the international community and with an unshakeable superpower backer. The head of the Palestinian Authority is a man with no state, little by way of guns, little by way of international recognition, little by way of backing and, nowadays it seems, little by way of local credibility among his supposed constituents. Moreover, of the issue they are negotiating over, the West Bank and Gaza strip, the former is occupied and controlled entirely and the latter is blockaded, squeezed and also controlled entirely by the Israeli Prime Minister. What the hell are they even negotiating over?

Clearly, from the Israeli perspective, the offer of a Palestinian state stands for two main reasons, long-term peace and security and being ‘the right thing to do’. But the former doesn’t seem an urgent need now to Israelis. There is a smattering of rockets still being fired, suicide bombings have been dead in the water (pardon the pun) and recognition by Arab states seems sort of irrelevant when Israel has economic agreements if not fully-fledged normalised relations with most of them anyway. So, to put it simply, there isn’t very much in it for Israel but there’s a whole damn lot in it for the Palestinians.

Perhaps you may then note that this means even moreso that the Israeli PM is doing the Palestinians some sort of favour out of the “goodness of his own heart.” Perhaps that is the case, but if the negotiations are to be taken seriously we have to assume that both parties are equally serious about them. That’s how negotiations work, that’s what they are by definition.

So what of all these tabled offers from the Israeli side? Let’s face it, the Israelis are the only ones that can *make* offers. They hold all the cards and all the chips and all the odds and all the other gambling analogies. They occupy, they control, they settle and they hold power. The Palestinian PM can offer little but non-violence, and since violence from the Palestinians isn’t much of a threat right now anyway, and the violence that *is* a threat may well be about of the PM’s control, it’s not much of an offer.

How then are we to judge the Palestinians walking away from the table as a crime of the highest order? As I said, if we are to view the peace process as legitimate we have to assume both parties are serious, this means we have to take both parties demands seriously. The Palestinians want halt to settlement, right of return, East Jerusalem as a capital, and a land link between the West Bank and Gaza as minimums. While I personally believe that right of return is not feasible, it’s still a legitimate issue that demands serious attention. In a negotiation, if one side makes an offer that the other is not happy with, the other has the right to walk away from it, especially if the other has a very tenuous grip on representation of his population (part of the reason why the whole peace process is majorly flawed). In the 2000 offer, I saw little to no mention of a land link between Gaza and the West Bank, and I am not entirely sure how much of East Jerusalem the Palestinians were suppose to get. The refugee issue was also sort of brushed over. In the more recent and recently leaked offer from Olmert to Abbas, I saw no mention of East Jerusalem or the Right of Return also. Perhaps I’ve missed something, if so, let me know.

But it’s not actually important what the details of the two agreements were. Arafat or Abbas not agreeing to a proposal from the Israelis should not be seen as a failure by default. It is a negotiation, any unilateral offer made can be rejected and a counteroffer needs to be negotiated. That’s how negotiations work. While the lack of follow-up on both proposals is regrettable, and that is something we can criticise the leaders over, it is not something to crucify them over either. If the Israeli PMs in question were serious about their offers, or if indeed the more important issue of their constituencies and Knessets were serious, then these offers can be retabled. No facts have changed on the ground apart from increased Israeli settlement, intensified blockade on Gaza and diminished Palestinian violence, all facts that should not work against the Palestinian side in negotiations.

So in conclusion, let’s keep in mind the following fact: while it is obvious that the only side capable of making a legitimate offer (because it holds all the cards) is the Israeli side, for negotiations to work, both sides need to be seen as equal players. If the Palestinians were to make an offer that the Israelis rejected, would you consider that Israeli PM to be a failure? No. We need to stop viewing an Israeli offer for a Palestinian state as some kind of charity, it is ‘the right thing to do’, but it is not charity. There is something in it for both sides, even if it comes down to a moral question. A state for the Palestinians is their right, it is not a gift bestowed upon them by a benevolent Israeli politician. Until we view it this way, the peace process can never be taken seriously.

Under my umbrella. Ella. Ella. Eh? Eh?

Haaretz has made public details about the supposed map of a proposal that Ehud Olmert offered Abu Mazen to delineate a prospective Palestinian state. Details of the map and proposal have always previously remained clandestine:

Together, the areas would have involved the transfer of 327 square kilometers of territory from within the Green Line.

Olmert presented his map to Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas in September of last year. Abbas did not respond, and negotiations ended. In an interview with Haaretz on Tuesday, Abbas said Olmert had presented several drafts of his map.

Olmert wanted to annex 6.3 percent of the West Bank to Israel, areas that are home to 75 percent of the Jewish population of the territories. His proposal would have also involved evacuation of dozens of settlements in the Jordan Valley, in the eastern Samarian hills and in the Hebron region. In return for the annexation to Israel of Ma’aleh Adumim, the Gush Etzion bloc of settlements, Ariel, Beit Aryeh and settlements adjacent to Jerusalem, Olmert proposed the transfer of territory to the Palestinians equivalent to 5.8 percent of the area of the West Bank as well as a safe-passage route from Hebron to the Gaza Strip via a highway that would remain part of the sovereign territory of Israel but where there would be no Israeli presence.

Olmert is currently suggesting that his map provide the basis for the resumption of negotiations with the Palestinians. In his talks with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and foreign statesmen, the former prime minister has said the international community must demand a formal response from Abbas to the Olmert proposal and proceed from there in the talks. Olmert has not presented the detailed map to Netanyahu.

While this can be seen as an admirable effort by Olmert, I’m not sure how feasible it is. I seriously question Olmert’s, Netanyahu’s or anyone else’s ability to get this through the Knesset unscathed and actually deliever this kind of land to the Palestinians. This is what makes Middle Eastern peace such a difficult proposition. The other notable thing is that there is no mention of East Jerusalem or of a Right of Return. While I personally believe the latter is unfeasible and not something the Palestinians can expect to receive, the former, in my opinion, or East Jerusalem being the capital of a Palestinian state, should be a minimum condition to peace or land deals. If the original proposal did not include East Jerusalem then it is perfectly understandable that Abu Mazen didn’t want to sign it, that sort of concession would need a great deal of thought and discussion, if it was to be made.

The Wailing Wall and Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem | Image Credit: PoliticalTheatrics.net

The EU has taken a stand, of sorts, on Jerusalem, stating that it needs to be shared between Israel and Palestine and that it must be the joint-capital of both states:

“If there is to be a genuine peace, a way must be found through negotiations to resolve the status of Jerusalem as the future capital of two states,” EU foreign ministers agreed in a statement released on Tuesday, diplomats said.

Antony Loewenstein sorta kinda assumed they were referring to East Jerusalem, but The Majlis points out that it was not mentioned and that this means something:

That was Israel’s main concern: There was a lot of fear that the EU would demand the 1967 borders be locked in place. If those borders were fixed, then major Jewish settlements like Gilo would become part of a future Palestinian state — an unacceptable outcome for the Israeli government. The original policy document, drafted by Sweden, made just that demand, but it was watered down in last-minute discussions this morning.

To be fair, the wording of the original statement was pretty rigid:

“The EU will not recognize any changes to the pre-1967 borders, including with regard to Jerusalem,” said the [original]  EU ministerial draft. [Haaretz]

I don’t think it necessarily warrants some of the Israeli rhetoric though, like comparing Sweden’s approach to Israeli-Palestinian peace to IKEA furniture, as one official said:

“The peace process in the Middle East is not like IKEA furniture,” one official said, making a reference to the do-it-yourself Swedish furniture chain. “It takes more than a screw and a hammer, it takes a true understanding of the constraints and sensitivities of both sides, and in that Sweden failed miserably.” [FP]

FP makes a good point on this:

Please. The original draft praises both Israel’s settlement freeze and U.S. mediation efforts. You can debate whether or not it’s productive for Sweden to be issuing proclamations on where the Palestinian border should be drawn, but in the end, these declarations have only about as much weight as the parties involved choose to give them. Which, judging from the righteous outrage out of Avigdor Lieberman’s shop, seems to be quite a lot. This sort of thing might play well to Lieberman’s political base, but internationally it just gives the EU’s East Jerusalem critique way more publicity than it would have had before.

The Swedes hold the EU rotating presidency at the moment, and the EU is an entity that people listen to, it’s not one of the unfortunately irrelevant minor countries of the UN General Assembly. If Israel chooses to respond to Swedish declarations in this manner, it just gives them more prominence and ensures that more people listen. While the EU obviously doesn’t have the same sort of international clout as the US, it’s definitely not irrelevant and the Israelis are only making it more relevant, particularly in the international press.

Interestingly, Haaretz also calls the claims over Jerusalem “the most intractable issue” in the conflict which to me seems a bit of an exaggeration. I’m pretty sure right of return, overall borders and demilitarisation of the Palestinian state are also pretty important issues. Oh and, Gaza/Hamas. I don’t think Israel’s going to let up on that one without a fight.

The Israelis have reacted in typical fashion to the resolution, ignoring the content of it itself and accusing it of not being productive for the ‘peace process’ (I’m starting to forget what that is meant to refer to) and calling “the Palestinian refusal to return to the negotiating table” the main factor halting peace negotiations at the moment. The settlement freeze notwithstanding, I’m pretty sure there are bigger factors than this one. Like maybe, Abu Mazen’s growing irrelevance? The US State Department has toed the line and, in not so many words, told the EU to stay out of it.

Meanwhile, Israel is attempting to further isolate Gaza by imposing an unofficial block on officials entering the territory. It’s run by terrorists y’all! Why would you want to go there? Go to Egypt instead, it’s nicer!

In other news:

- Check out the interview/eyewitness account of Cast Lead over at PoliticalTheatrics

- Iraq elections have been shifted to March 7th

- Lady Gaga met the Queen of England. ZOMG!

“]

Tariq al-Hashemi [EPA

Iraqi Elections in 2010 haven’t gotten much coverage on this blog but they have been covered fairly extensively elsewhere. The problems have been mostly sectarian in nature and dealing with perceived fairness in election law in preparation for a crucial poll that needs to be held next year, as per the constitution. While it doesn’t look like the poll will now go ahead in the month of January as it was supposed, February and March are being mooted as more likely months for it to happen.

The important thing is that it actually is happening, and I’m sure Obama is breathing a sigh of relief somewhere in the Oval Office at this one. Iraqi stability is important considering combat operations there are due to end next year and a successful run for the poll is a key precursor to the withdrawal of US troops.

The deadlock has been over representation for Sunnis, and also partly over the oil-rich northern city of Kirkuk (disputed by Kurds, Sunni Arabs and Turkmen). Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi threatened to veto the proposed changes to the electoral law but reportedly agreed at the last minute and the vote was passed unanimously. The law will reportedly expand parliament from 275 seats to 325 seats, 310 of which will be allotted to Iraq’s 18 provinces, with the remainder reserved for religious minorities and blocs that garnered national support but did not win seats. [Al Jazeera]

Pretty much everyone is predicting a rise in attacks from insurgents in the lead-up to the election and the tabled US withdrawal, the world will be watching Iraq next year with greatly renewed interest to see if the US occupation and ‘nation-building’ can in any way be vindicated. You can expect to see more Iraq-related coverage and opinion on this here blog also.

Ahmadinejad's "Armpit of Evil", thanks Guardian for the pic

I’ve been facing a combination of writer’s block, laziness and slow news days cropping up precisely on the days that I do have time to blog, a dangerous cocktail that helps explain my general lack of postage on this blog. I realise that the new set of Iran sanctions has already been heavily discussed, for those that haven’t heard

I’m not going to say a great deal on this issue except that I don’t particularly like it. I don’t remember when sanctions have ever been effective in getting a Government to do what people want them to do, they usually only serve to isolate and entrench despotic governments further (Saddam). In addition, while the specific set of sanctions hasn’t been finalised yet, there already has been a reasonable amount of opposition to specific measures that have been mooted.

Talking about the political implications, as The Majlis has mentioned, it seems that the Iranian regime is ready for these sanctions and looking to confront them head on. The amount of baiting that has been going on has been ramped up a great deal, especially with the announcement of building a further ten nuclear plants by the regime. How they intend to finance this with the Iranian economy in the doldrums that it’s in is of no consequence, the rhetoric here is what seems to be important. The Majlis also discusses the effect on the current rift in the Iranian political establishment. It seems to me that the conservative wing of Khamenei/Ahmadinejad is further entrenching itself in a position where the nuclear program is its baby and its baby alone. Reformists like Rafsanjani will not oppose the program either because they realise it would be political suicide after how much pro-nuclear propaganda has been effected on the population.

It seems that Obama’s unclench-your-fist rhetoric has failed and he’s now erring on the side of sanctions to preserve his own political capital. This spells bad news. Even if Russia and China do support the sanctions, no good will come of them. Sanctions will further serve to entrench the regime’s position against the West as “the Great Satan” and further entrench the Khamenei/Ahmadinejad axis in power, helping it out of its current political quandry. I may not have any helpful suggestions on the matter, but I don’t like sanctions.

photo credit: politicaltheatrics.net

Been a while since I last blogged, exams got the better of me and being in Sydney chilling has been counterproductive to blogging, but I’m back!

Despite discussions stalling somewhat and it now being said that a deal is more likely to take place after Eid al-Adha (Eid Mubarak to Muslims, by the way!) there have been reports of progress on the negotiations over the Gilad Shalit prisoner swap. Ismail Haniyeh even cancelled his Hajj! According to Haaretz, Israel is none too thrilled about certain prisoners that Hamas wants released:

Hamas is demanding, among other the prisoners, the release of Ibrahim Hamad, head of the group’s military wing in the Ramallah area, Abdallah Barghouti, a bomb engineer, and Abbas a-Sayad, the Hamas head in Tul Karm who planned the 2002 massacre during Passover in Netanya’s Park Hotel. These three prisoners are considered responsible for the murder of hundreds of Israelis.

Other names mentioned in the Arab media are Hassan Salame, who was involved in planning the suicide bus bombings in the mid ’90s, and Jamal Abu al-Hijla, head of Hamas in Jenin, who was convicted of taking part in planning and funding several suicide attacks during the second intifada.

Israel’s trepidation at having these prisoners freed is understandable, and the fact is, that political pressure from within Israel to have Shalit freed has been strong but not overwhelming so you can expect Israeli’s to hold out a while longer to get a better deal, politically especially (apparently having key suicide bombing planners freed can be harmful to one’s political standing). Most people are watching the fate of one Marwan Barghouti, considered a key possible successor to the increasingly beleaguered and probably-resigning Abu Mazen. You can expect Barghouti to be freed, Obama has been putting pressure on Netanyahu to make concessions that would bolster Fatah in the lead-up to PA elections and Abbas’ increasingly likely resignation.

The other major news is that during Obama’s visit to China, he put some pressure on the Chinese to do something about the whole Iran nuclear thing, which they have normally stayed clear out of (their policy of political non-involvement in the affairs of trading partners). The scare tactic used was the threat of Israel bombing Iran unilaterally (thus implying tacit US support) and the damage that would do to Iran as an energy source for China. The other scare tactic was the implication that other states could go nuclear, including Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, implying that Japan was another possibility (something China would not view kindly). [Thanks WashPo] [Check out a condensed report from Political Theatrics here.)

Antony Loewenstein is getting into a bit of a tizzy about it, suggesting that these talks imply Obama will certainly acquiesce to Israel bombing Iran, I disagree. While the jury is still out on how far Israel will go to defend against the ‘existential threat’ and how far the US will go in trying to stop them, I don’t think these statements to the Chinese should all be taken seriously. They are scare tactics and meant as such, Obama needs the Chinese to either support (or at least not veto) resolutions against Iran in the UN and given their mostly self-interested political philosophies, he needs to frighten them into submission. I mean a nuclear Egypt? Never happen. But bringing up a nuclear Japan is pretty damn scary, as is linking bombing Iran with energy security.

So here we have Obama clearly using Israel as an attack dog, or rather hinting at the possibility of it breaking its chains. Remember the Suez War in 56 when the British and French used Israel as an attack dog? Yeah, that didn’t end well for them.

Have just finished reading the Jalaluddin Haqqani interview that was linked to on Jihadica. (Urdu readers can find the whole interview here. ) While it doesn’t offer anything new – there’s lots of railing and ranting against the US’ highhandedness and dominance over the world, and praise of mujahideen – there are some interesting questions that were posed to him.

My translation is rather rough so please excuse any errors. Also, these are Haqqani’s terms – these would not be the terms I would use.

On the comparison b/w the Soviet and US invasions, Haqqani says that during the Soviet war the credit was mostly given to American Stinger missiles and weapons, but in the US invasion its been the fighters who have managed to do it on their own.

On the US plans to send more troops to Afghanistan: “I have said this before and am saying it again, that in the Afghanistan problem the US rulers are comparable to a gambler, who at the gambling table ends up losing everything after getting all warmed up.”

On the plan to negotiate with the Taliban: “Yes! After eight years Americans have realized that their current policy for Afghanistan is not favourable, and it needs to be changed. There will be different stages to this:

1. An increase in troops
2. Spreading discord between different tribes/groups
3. Talking to the mujahideen in Afghanistan

Haqqani says the first two have already been acted on and that the US will use the talks as a cover for the following

• Spreading distrust among the mujahideen. By distrust he says that the talks will be a propaganda tool that will be given extensive media coverage and every element of the discussions will be disclosed to give a feeling that talks are happening
• Starting talks would give Karzai’s puppet government a legal standing.
• If the talks fail, the US would hold the Taliban responsible and say they want to continue the war.
• The Taliban wanted to talk to the US eight years ago, but they didn’t want to and chose to invade instead. Now after a war that has killed thousands, destroyed villages, and further destroyed an already destroyed Afghanistan, and spending billions of dollars, they still don’t understand that military force is not the solution to everything.

On AfPak

Q: South Afghanistan borders Pakistan. The Karzai government spreads propoganda that the planning for jihad activities in this area is actually done in Pakistan and that you are in control of foreign fighters?

A: The Karzai government’s basis is of 27 occupying countries. They baselessly propagandize, in response to which I only say this that if in reality the planning of activities in southern Afghanistan are being done in a neighbouring country, then where is the planning of activities in the northern and main regions being done? In the central zone of the country there have been country-level military operations. That is where the most occupiers are killed, but those are not affiliated to a certain country. In the same way in the country’s northern zone Qunduz, Baghlan, Balkh, Badakshan and Jozjan are very far away from the country’s south, so where are the activities on foreign occupiers and their allies being planned on there?

In reality, if support from neighbouring country to Afghanistan can be called a victory, then the Karzai government – which has the military and political support of 37 countries, including neighbouring ones – would rule over Afghanistan. Yes! In the bordering areas, some religious youngsters have a spirit for jihad, whose fathers and grandfathers fought side by side with their Afghan brothers to fight against British and Russian occupiers. Some were martyred here while others were victors. That same spirit is still prevalent today against American occupation amongst brave people. We appreciate their support in the jihad and expect them to fulfill their jihad duties.

On Obama

Q: In America, the Democrats have come to power under Obama. What effect will this have on the war in Afghanistan?

A: “….The American public trusted Obama, and voted him into power. Hence Obama should save his country from the fire that Bush had shoved it in.”

I have thought quite a bit about whether to post this story. Its possibly one of the most heartrending reports about the impact of suicide bombings on Pakistan, where a suicide bomber seems to blow himself up on an almost daily basis.  But in the midst of the inane debates and Denialistan and the general sense of ‘how the hell do we get out of this situation?!’, does anyone realize what is happening to the children of this beleaguered country?

Eight-year-old Abid Mehmood was sifting through the debris of the bombed market in Pakistan’s north-western city of Peshawar for metal and plastic pieces when he found something unusual – a human eyeball. The remains of a body that the powerful blast might have burnt or even dissolved a day earlier had enough shine and colour to attract the child, who immediately collected it in a plastic bag.

Hours later, he found a plastic jar and dipped the eyeball in the water and started to pick through the rubble to find more.

“I have collected seven eyes but there should be one more. After all, every person has two eyes,” said Mehmood as he showed the jar to a reporter.

“They look beautiful, don’t they?” he said in the Meena Bazaar, the once-busy market where a suicide bomber killed 119 people and injured over 200 on October 28.

Indifference to death is increasingly becoming a defence mechanism for psychologically tormented children in Peshawar, where Taliban have killed several hundred people in dozens of suicide bombings over the last two years.

“We are seeing more and more children who show little reaction to death and the dead ones,” Peshawar-based psychiatrist and social worker Dr Khalid Mufti said.

“The other day an 11-year-old child whose father died and brother lost his legs in a recent blast told me that he was waiting for his turn like everyone else in the town,” added Mufti.

“The kid was smiling. You know, this is what the war does to children: it robs them of their innocence.”

Read the rest here. Link via the Pakistan Conflict Monitor.